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2002 through FY 2014), rather than specific policies, operations, or external events. 
A comparative analysis of the pre-9/11 (FY 1999 through FY 2001) and 
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As no budget can accurately plan for the future, certain flexibilities are incorporated 
into the process to allow for the movement of funds across budget lines. Reprogramming 
is one of the primary tools Congress has in order to provide the required flexibility to meet 
changing demands. In his 2007 research, Chad Roum conducted one of the first in-depth 
analyses on the nature of Department of Defense (DoD) reprogramming. He studied the 
available reprogramming documents from 1999 through 2006 and was able to identify the 
most common types of reprogramming, the peak times during the fiscal year (FY) for 
reprogramming actions, and the typical congressional reactions to reprogramming requests 
(Roum, 2007). 
Roum also recommended several areas for further study, which required analyzing 
more data over a longer period of time than Roum was able to process. He suggested the 
ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan may have played a significant role in the number of 
reprogramming actions required to fund the military operations, but was unable to provide 
definitive data to prove or disprove this hypothesis. 
Our project continues Roum’s research and provides insight on his 
recommendations for follow-up research topics. The period from 2007 through 2018 was 
analyzed using the available documents from the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller) website. The scope of the research was widened, and additional topics 
related to reprogramming were studied. A specific focus on determining the average length 
of time a reprogramming action takes from inception through to approval or denial would 
provide vital information to Defense Department budgeting workforce. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
Roum’s foundational work on studying the nature of DoD reprogramming noted 
that while there was an overall increase in the amount of reprogramming dollars from 
1999 through 2006, the total amount reprogrammed stayed within 4.2% to 5.4% of the total 
DoD budget. 
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Roum did observe several anomalies that ran contrary to the assumptions and 
evidence that major military conflicts drove increases in reprogramming requests. The 9/11 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon actually resulted in a short-term 
decrease in reprogramming documents being adjusted as a result of not wanting to give the 
appearance of impeding the president’s push to prosecute terrorists. 
President Bush requested a supplemental appropriation from Congress for a timely 
response to the 9/11 attack, which was not funded through normal defense appropriations. 
This practice of requesting supplemental appropriations for war-related expenses 
continued through FY 2011, and is discussed in the next chapter. The use of these 
supplemental appropriations likely had an effect on reprogramming actions because a new 
requirement could simply be funded with additional money rather than taking money from 
another program. 
Many of Roum’s assumptions about the increases in frequency and magnitude of 
reprogramming centered around the DoD’s engagement with operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan during his period of analysis. 
Congressional resistance of reprogramming was also measured by counting the 
percentage of prior approval (PA) reprogramming actions that were adjusted, postponed, 
or cancelled. Roum found that roughly 85 % of all PA reprogramming requests were met 
with no resistance (Roum, 2007, p. 50). 
Interestingly, Roum noted presidential election cycles may affect the amount of PA 
reprogramming actions in a given year. When a newly elected president takes office on 
January 20, the President’s Budget (PB) is in the final stages of development, and is 
submitted to Congress on the first Monday in February (Roum, 2007, p. 51). Any newly 
elected president will have a team to help ease the transition into the first year in office, 
but from the second year onward a new president has complete control over the 
development of the PB.  
Mark Kugler’s analysis, titled “Marine Corps Budgetary Reprogramming 
Effectiveness”, expanded on some of the reprogramming areas Roum had focused on. In 
order to get Marine Corps specific facts and figures, Kugler conducted a macro-level 
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analysis on the entirety of DoD reprogramming actions from 2005 through 2014. Kugler 
noted that Marine Corps reprogramming actions and amounts generally decreased from 
year to year, aside from a large spike in FY 2008, mirroring trends DoD-wide during that 
same period (Kugler, 2015, p. 43). 
Funding related to operations and maintenance (O&M) typically accounted for both 
the majority of reprogramming dollars, and the total number of reprogramming actions in 
both research studies. Kugler’s analysis noted two fiscal years where procurement 
exceeded O&M by approximately 1%. 
This study analyzed the reprogramming actions from all internal, prior approval, 
and letter reprogramming actions from FY 2007 through FY 2018 available from the Office 
of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)) website.  Like Roum’s thesis, 
this project used descriptive statistics to analyze and interpret the data to answer the 
primary and secondary research questions. 
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Primary Research Question 
The primary question for Roum’s and this study was, “what is the nature of Defense 
Department reprogramming?” Congress provides the DoD limited authority each year to 
obligate funds for purposes other than originally intended. With this authority, the DoD 
can reprogram (shift of funds within the same account) or transfer funds from one 
appropriation or account to another (Congressional Research Service, 2020). This research 
intends to gain continued insight for DoD budget managers into general reprogramming 
trends from FY 2007 through 2018 with the potential to highlight areas for improvement 
within the budgeting process. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a) How many different reprogramming requests and actions occur annually 
and what are the typical dollar amounts involved? 
b) What are the reprogramming amounts and frequencies for each agency? 
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c) Which funding categories have the most funding reprogrammed, and which 
funding categories are most frequently involved in reprogramming? 
d) Which budget activities have the most funding reprogrammed, and which 
budget activities are most frequently involved in reprogramming? 
e) Are there specific periods throughout the year when reprogramming actions 
are more or less utilized? 
f) How long does the average reprogramming action take from inception 
through to acceptance or denial? 
g) How frequently does Congress adjust reprogramming actions, and are there 
any patterns observed with those adjustments? 
h) What changes or trends have occurred during the period of analysis that 
may have influenced reprogramming? 
Our research centers on the magnitude and frequency of reprogramming during a 
fiscal year, but also provides insight into the processing time of a reprogramming action, 
when that data was available. Magnitude refers to dollars amounts reprogrammed while 
frequency translates to the number of reprogramming actions in a specific fiscal year. This 
research’s tracking of time from introduction of a reprogramming action through its 
approval, denial, or adjustment will specifically address only Navy reprogramming actions 
that utilized the Program Budget Information System (PBIS), the U.S. Navy budget offices’ 
primary administrative tool for budget related internal control and tracking. Knowing the 
approximate amount of time that a reprogramming request will take from inception through 
approval allows DoD programmers and comptrollers better insight into both when they can 
expect funding to become available for specific requests, and when reprogramming actions 
need to start in order to meet a specified deadline. 
Reprogramming actions occur throughout a fiscal year beginning October 1. The 
frequency and magnitude are dependent upon review cycles within the budget year of 
execution, and the DoD’s reaction to real-time events and shifts in strategic planning. 
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The different types of reprogramming, the appropriations and budget activities 
involved, and the scale at which each service utilizes reprogramming will be explained. 
Additionally, each defense committee’s involvement with denying, adjusting, or 
postponing reprogramming actions, including the dollar amounts and frequency of 
involvement, will be quantified. This analysis may help the services to identify trends for 
specific committees and allow prioritization of time and resources when submitting PA 
reprogramming requests.  
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Our period of analysis covers all DoD reprogramming actions from FY 2007 
through FY 2018, which, when viewed with Roum’s initial study, will cover 20 years of 
analysis. For continuity of research findings, this descriptive analysis focuses, in part, on 
four major areas from Roum’s research: the observation of characteristics involving the 
amount of money and the frequency in which reprogramming occurs, when reprogramming 
actions typically occur, quantifying congressional resistance with defense committees, and 
tracking of the inflow and outflow of reprogrammed funds among certain accounts. 
Additionally, the timespan of a reprogramming action within the Navy from initiation 
through approval, adjustment, or denial will be observed.  
Finally, this research will attempt to make connections with any trends or major 
changes in defense policy during the period of observation while comparing the findings 
with the analysis and assumptions made in Roum’s original thesis. 
E. DEFINITIONS 
For this study, the term “reprogramming,” refers to all types of reprogramming 
unless specifically referenced as prior approval, internal transfer, letter, or below threshold 
actions. Each type of reprogramming is described in Chapter II. “Defense committees” is 
a term used to describe the four committees involved in the review and approval of 
reprogramming requests. These committees are the House Armed Services Committee 
(HASC) and Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), as well 6 as the Defense 
6 
subcommittees of the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) and Senate Appropriations 
Committee (SAC). 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The following chapters of this study provide an outline for the reader on the 
background of this research, the methodology used, presentation of the results, and finally 
an analysis and conclusion. The information collected will be presented, and references 
and assumptions tied to DoD trends and strategic policy changes will be made, which may 
cause deviations from average magnitude and frequency metrics of reprogramming actions. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. UNDERSTANDING REPROGRAMMING 
To understand the nature of reprogramming you must first describe the system in 
which reprogramming occurs. History on the evolution of reprogramming will provide 
context on why reprogramming is needed within the governmental budgeting process. 
Additionally, the types of reprogramming will be explained in an effort to provide a better 
understanding of the data presented when answering the research questions. 
1. Historical Perspective on Reprogramming 
a. Source of Reprogramming 
Article I, Sections 7–10 of the U.S. Constitution outline the power and limitations 
placed onto Congress regarding federal taxation and spending decisions, while Section 8 
specifically gives Congress the “power of the purse” (Candreva, 2017, p. 92). 
Fiscal law 31 U.S. Code § 1301(a), requires the executive branch to spend funds as 
appropriated, and they must have authority to use them for purposes other than originally 
intended. The shifting of funds between different appropriations is facilitated through 
use of reprogramming requests. Typically, only PA actions require congressional approval 
as the others are authorized by virtue of the language in the appropriations bill or other 
fiscal law. 
b. Evolution of Reprogramming 
Louis Fisher wrote a comprehensive work on reprogramming in 1975, titled 
Presidential Spending Power. His work chronicles the back-and-forth battle between the 
executive and legislative branches of government regarding presidential spending power. 
First instances of reprogramming can be traced as far back as the 1790s, with Fisher 
highlighting many specific instances when U. S. presidential authority to transfer 
appropriated funding for defense purposes was granted or rescinded (Fisher, 1975). 
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A more recent look into reprogramming is briefly discussed in Philip Candreva’s 
book titled National Defense Budgeting and Financial Management. Magnitude of 
reprogramming dollars spent in past years, as well as frequency of reprogramming actions 
are briefly discussed during a time period that crosses Roum’s initial work and extends 
through FY 2014.  
Candreva’s figures show the number of internal and PA reprogramming actions 
gradually declined from FY 2000 through 2014, except for a spike in FY 2005. The amount 
of dollars reprogrammed during the same period rose gradually until a step increase in FY 
2008 reached $49.8B, after which a gradual decrease was observed through FY 2014, 
ultimately descending to a combined $14.44B for internal and PA reprogramming. 
Additionally, Candreva noted that O&M accounts were most affected by reprogramming 
during this period, followed by procurement, military personnel, and research and 
development (Candreva, 2017, p. 327). 
2. Types of Reprogramming 
The DoD categorizes reprogramming into four separate types: PA, internal transfer, 
letter, and below threshold. These requests are documented using DD Form 1415–1, DD 
Form 1415–3, or a memorandum from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Each 
type of reprogramming has its own criteria for classification (CRS, 2020). 
a. Prior Approval Reprogramming 
Prior approval (PA) reprogramming actions use DD Form 1415–1 and describe the 
movement of funding within or between appropriations. This type of reprogramming 
request requires approval from the HAC, HASC, SAC, and SASC chairmen. PA 
reprogramming requests are typically submitted on a monthly basis, but can be submitted 
as needed. 
Additionally, after the mid-year review process, an omnibus reprogramming 
request is typically created, combining multiple requests into a single request, streamlining 
the submission process for the approval committees and personnel. PA actions are 
9 
collectively referred to as “above threshold” reprogramming. Programs that utilize PA 
reprogramming actions should meet at least one of the following criteria (CRS, 2020): 
• Increasing the number of units of a major end item (e.g., ships, aircraft, 
missiles); 
• Starting a new program or terminating a program; 
• If the action affects funding for a congressional special interest item defined 
as items for which additional funds have been provided, or for items which 
funding is specifically reduced using the terminology “only for’ or “only 
to”; 
• If general transfer authority is used (the movement of funds from 
supplemental appropriations is done using general transfer authority 
provided in the annual Defense Appropriations Act); or 
• When the value exceeds specified thresholds.  
Figure 1 shows the routing process of a typical PA reprogramming action. It 
denotes the offices and committees involved that may either approve, deny, or adjust a 
reprogramming request at the defense committee level. 
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Figure 1. DoD Prior Approval Reprogramming Action Process. 
Source: Congressional Research Service (2020). 
b. Internal Reprogramming  
 Internal reprogramming actions normally do not require congressional approval 
and are used when congressional intent or purpose has not been changed, and none of the 
triggering criteria for a PA action have been met. Internal reprogramming transfers 
typically involve the following: 
• Reclassifying funding from different appropriations, line items, or program 
elements may be used when the substance of a program has not changed; 
• Using transfer authority to execute funds from designated transfer accounts; 
and 
• Anytime approval has already been granted to increase the number of major 
end items that do not otherwise trigger PA criteria 
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c. Letter Reprogramming 
This type of reprogramming is by memorandum and used when transfers need to 
be made to existing programs that were directed by Congress in an appropriation act and 
fall below the threshold for PA reprogramming actions (Candreva, 2017, p. 326). 
d. Below Threshold Reprogramming 
This type of reprogramming is used when transfers need to be made to existing 
programs as directed by Congress in an appropriation act, and that fall below the threshold 
of PA reprogramming criteria (Candreva, 2017, p. 326). Below threshold amounts include 
realignments of less than $15M within O&M accounts, less than $20M or 20% within a 
procurement line item, or a realignment of less than $10M, or 20% within a research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) program element or account 
(comptroller.defense.gov/budget-execution). 
3. Reasons for Reprogramming 
The DoD uses the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
system to formulate and execute the defense budget. PPBE is a calendar driven process 
used by organizations that must be responsive to real-time unfolding events (Candreva, 
2017, p. 169). While the DoD finalizes budgets up to two years in advance, this process is 
being continually modified due to events external to the DoD, whose new developments 
often require an immediate defense response. 
Supplemental appropriations are to be used for emergency situations of a temporary 
nature, providing budget authority outside of original intentions. For example, the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 caused President Bush to send a supplemental appropriation 
request to Congress in order to combat the sudden and unexpected attack. This request 
received little opposition and was done in haste to expedite the relief effort. Furthermore, 
the ensuing costs of the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other operations tied to the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) were not funded through normal defense appropriations, but 
instead through supplemental appropriations, such as the Iraq Freedom Fund (Candreva, 
2017, p. 406). 
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This trend continued until FY 2011, when the Obama administration moved away 
from the use of supplemental appropriations and tried to capture war-related expenses 
under the submission of both an annual base defense budget and a war budget. In reality, 
this only replaced the term GWOT with Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) and had 
relatively no changes in the funds’ intended purpose (Candreva, 2017, p. 406). By moving 
away from ad hoc supplemental requests for the war to annual requests coinciding with the 
budget, the use of wartime funding to meet urgent demands is reduced, and one would 
therefore expect to see an increase in reprogrammings’ frequency or magnitude.  
Many of Roum’s assumptions on the magnitude and frequency of reprogramming 
actions centered on the GWOT campaign and the budgeting environment that enabled the 
government to use supplemental appropriations to fund the ongoing war effort. When this 
occurs, money first shifts to a transfer account, and then has to be reprogrammed from the 
transfer account into the required accounts necessary for operations (Roum, 2007). As a 
result, there may be differences in the research’s findings based on changes in the national 
defense priorities and the ways in which war efforts are currently funded, in that base 
defense budgets are separated from OCO budget submissions. 
Reprogramming can also be triggered by the obligation period of an appropriation. 
Current year budget authority reprogramming actions make up the majority of all 
reprogramming, as prior year funding obligations that are about to expire are frequently 
reprogrammed into accounts that make those balances available for use, preventing those 
funds from becoming unavailable (Candreva, 2017, p. 326). 
Other examples of issues requiring reprogramming include incorrect cost estimates, 
wage-rate price adjustments where actual cost exceeds the budget’s requested funding 
requested, and foreign currency fluctuations.  
Cost estimations are primarily based on historical data. In some cases, cost 
estimators are asked to come up with estimates based on one-of-a-kind major end items. 
These costs can increase rapidly, impacting current and future budget submissions. For 
example, the Zumwalt class destroyer program, which was set to replace the Arleigh 
Burke-class destroyer, experienced massive cost overruns, leading to a reduced order 
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(Fredenburg, 2016). This led to multiple reprogramming requests as billions of dollars now 
became available. 
Presidential election cycles often signal turnover of executive cabinet members and 
Service Secretaries. With these newly elected and appointed officials, there is often a 
change in the defense priorities. As a result, modifications to existing national defense 
strategies and policies are implemented, which also call for reprogramming funding from 
those items now deemed less necessary to those that are determined to be more vital to the 
overall defense strategy. Election cycle results and the reprogramming that occurs 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Answering the primary and secondary research questions required a three-step 
process. The data was collected first, by downloading reprogramming documents directly 
from the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and DoD Planning Budget Information 
System (PBIS) websites. The second step involved building a spreadsheet to document the 
material within each of the reprogramming documents. This enabled us to filter and present 
the information in a clear and useful manner. The final step was interpreting the 
information from the spreadsheet and providing recommendations and findings. 
1. Sources of Data 
All of the data required to answer the research questions was gathered from The 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Department of the Navy (DON) PBIS 
websites. All of the available reprogramming documents from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
were downloaded and stored locally on a SharePoint. These documents were Portable 
Document Format (PDF) files, which were typically physical scans of hand-signed 
reprogramming actions. They were categorized into fiscal years and separated by the type 
of reprogramming action used – PA, internal, and letter. The fourth type of reprogramming 
actions, below threshold, were not available. 
Of the documents available, the primary focus was on five elements for each 
reprogramming action: 
a. Funding category 
b. Branch affected 
c. Budget activity 
d. Amount requested 
e. Amount approved 
Secondary information captured included: 
a. Date each reprogramming action was approved 
b. Tally of legislative committees that made any adjustments, delays, or 
denials 
An example of a reprogramming document is shown in Figure 2. 
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Reprogramming documents are stored on the DoD Comptroller website for public viewing.  
This sample document is from 2010 and used to illustrate how the data was compiled for 
completing the research of this study. 
Figure 2. Sample Reprogramming Document. Source: Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). (2019a).  
The DD Form 1415–1 sample document shows a total increase of $40,000, all of 
which was added to Defense Working Capital Fund, Defense Wide, Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA). The source of funding was a decrease to the Defense Working Capital 
Fund, Air Force, USTRANSCOM. In this example, Congress did not alter or change any 
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of the amounts. If Congress did alter the amount, the amount would be lined out and the 
approved amount would be listed to the right of the lined-out amount. 
Ultimately, each document balanced the increased amounts requested with the 
decrease amounts requested, and the increased amounts approved with the decreased 
amounts approved, with only a few exceptions. Occasionally, there were instances where 
these totals did not match, indicating errors in the reprogramming documents. Some were 
minor typos, and best judgment was used to correct the numbers. Others referenced 
separate reprogramming documents that had already balanced, but this practice was used 
sparingly. Problems arose as the referencing other documents technique was not 
standardized, making it difficult to correctly identify exactly which accounts had been 
tapped for adjustment. Finally, there were several other instances where the accounts did 
not balance on either side, with the most likely explanation being that an account had been 
unintentionally omitted from the form. It was not possible to identify if these anomalies 
were addressed after they were approved. The occasions in which errors were identified 
were not drastic enough (0.4% or 0.004 of the total amount requested, and 0.2%, or 0.002 
of the total amounts approved) to change the results of the data or findings.  
2. Organization of Data 
An extensive spreadsheet in Microsoft Excel was created to input the data. Starting 
in FY 2007, every reprogramming action was manually recorded from each internal, PA, 
and letter document through FY 2018. Due to the nature of the PDF scans, there was no 
automated input method, nor was there the ability to copy and paste figures and accounts 
directly. This required every document to be individually read and recorded. The following 
data was transcribed from the reprogramming documents:  
a. Reprogramming Administrative Category (PA, Internal or Letter) 
b. Fiscal Year 
c. DoD Serial Number 
d. Subject 
e. Increase Funding Category 
f. Increasing Agency 
g. Increase Budget Activity 
h. Increase Amount Requested 
i. Increase Amount Approved 
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j. Decrease Funding Category 
k. Decrease Agency 
l. Decrease Amount Requested 
m. Decrease Amount Approved 
n. Date Approved 
o. Organizational Review 
p. Organizational Code 
q. Part (1 of 2/3/4, etc.) 
r. Notes 
The information was copied exactly from each reprogramming document into its 
corresponding location on the spreadsheet. After all the information was recorded, the 
master data sheet was spot checked for consistency and validity of data entered. In total, 
10,859 transactions occurred across the 977 available reprogramming documents from FY 
2007 through FY 2018. Figure 3 is a small sample of the spreadsheet that was created, 
which illustrates how the information that was taken from each reprogramming document 
was entered to build the majority of the data set. 
 
The sample spreadsheet illustrates how the information was compiled utilizing the reprogramming 
documents.  The information entered on the spreadsheet was then analyzed and used to build the tables and 
graphs in this study which answer the research questions.  
Figure 3. Sample of the Data Spreadsheet 
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The remaining data was collected from the PBIS website to capture the timing 
aspect of the research. This data was obtained from historical PDF files and were not 
changed or manipulated. The following key information was pulled from the 
reprogramming documents to answer the timing questions: 
a. Fiscal Year 
b. Reprogramming Administrative Category 
c. Serial Number 
d. Earliest Approval Date 
e. Date Forwarded to Congress 
f. Finished Date 
 
The sample spreadsheet illustrates how the information was compiled utilizing the reprogramming 
documents found on the PBIS website.  The information entered on the spreadsheet was then analyzed and 
used to build the tables and graphs to answer the timing related questions of this study. 
Figure 4. Sample of the PBIS Data Sheet  
The information gathered from PBIS allowed for the calculation of how long each 
Navy PA reprogramming action took from initial formal request through the date when the 
funds were officially apportioned, identified on the spreadsheet as the date finished. This 
enabled the calculation of total time for congressional approval of each PA reprogramming 
action for the Navy. 
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3. Presentation of Data 
Using the two spreadsheets provided an efficient way to visually present the data. 
Since the information was manually entered into Excel, it was easily transformed into a 
readable and visual presentation sufficient to answer the research questions. While the 
budget activities were typically entered verbatim into the spreadsheets, some accounts and 
budget activities were consolidated into various groups after entry in order to streamline 
similar lines of funding. For instance, the Air Force specifically used budget activity “5: 
Modification of Inservice Aircraft” universally for their reprogramming requests, whereas 
the other branches utilized “5: Modification of Aircraft.” In this instance, the Air Force 
budget activity titles were all changed to match the other branches, to provide a clearer 
indication of what kinds of budgets were being modified. Finally, the specific defense-
wide agency or activity (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, 
National Security Agency) whose budgets were modified were all captured where 




IV. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
When trying to determine the nature of reprogramming, there are a multitude of 
factors to consider, many of which will be addressed here.  
First, general statistics will be presented on the frequency of reprogramming 
request documents, the number of individual reprogramming actions, and the typical dollar 
amounts involved. Next, the general statistics regarding how much each agency, funding 
category, and budget activity are specifically used for reprogramming will be presented. 
With the raw numbers now out of the way, timing is the next factor worth 
considering. By analyzing how often reprogramming requests are approved over the course 
of the year, periods of increased action can be identified. Additionally, the amount of time 
that a reprogramming action takes from initial internal approval through congressional 
approval will be presented. 
Finally, other elements related to reprogramming will be addressed, to include how 
often congressional adjustments occur, and the identification of how specific trends may 
have affected reprogramming during the period of study. 
A. HOW MANY DIFFERENT REPROGRAMMING REQUESTS AND 
ACTIONS OCCUR ANNUALLY AND WHAT ARE THE TYPICAL 
DOLLAR AMOUNTS INVOLVED? 
The first logical step in any reprogramming trend analysis is to simply calculate the 
general frequency and the sheer amount of money that is being reprogrammed. 
This was completed by manually entering the available data from the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) website into Microsoft Excel, and generating tables 
and figures based on those inputs to determine the number of reprogramming requests, 
actions, and dollar amounts involved. 
A reprogramming “request” is defined as a single document accessed through the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) website. A reprogramming “action” is defined 
as the movement of funding from one defined budget activity or account to another. For 
instance, the movement of $100 from the Air Force’s aircraft maintenance budget to their 
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PCS budget would count as two total actions, one decrease (the maintenance budget) and 
one increase (the PCS budget). Reprogramming requests will be addressed first, followed 
by reprogramming actions. 
Table 1 shows the total number of reprogramming requests from FY 2007 through 
FY 2018. FY 2007 and FY 2008 were the peak years for total reprogramming requests, 
after which they began generally trending downward. Figure 5 shows a small bubble in 
prior approval requests, which began rising between FY 2014 and FY 2015, before tapering 
back off in FY 2017 and FY 2018. There were also more internal reprogramming requests 
than prior approval or letter every year, except for FY 2017, where there were slightly more 
prior approval reprogramming requests. 
Table 1. Number of Reprogramming Requests from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
 
 
Figure 5. Change in Number of Available Reprogramming Requests 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
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Next, the individual number of reprogramming actions in total, and for each type 
of reprogramming from FY 2007 through FY 2018 were counted. A separation has been 
made to distinguish between accounts that are gaining funding (“Increase”) and accounts 
that are losing funding (“Decrease”). It is important to note, all the years of research except 
FY 2013 experienced more increase than decreases.  
Table 2 is a summation of all reported reprogramming actions from FY 2007 
through FY 2018, while Figure 6 graphs the data. The number of actions can be fairly well 
split into two time periods. From 2007 through 2012, there were 1,042 total reprogramming 
actions on average each year. From 2013 through 2018, the average total number of 
reprogramming actions each year drops by nearly 25% to 767. 
Generally, the total number of actions each year increases or decreases as the total 
number of reprogramming requests increases or decreases, which is to be expected. FY 
2007 serves as the lone exception to this trend, there the total number of requests (1,008 – 
slightly below the mean amount of 1,042 from FY 2007 through FY 2012) was 
comparatively low to the number actions (133; the highest amount of actions in a single 
year from FY 2007 through FY 2018). 





Figure 6. Change in Number of Reprogramming Actions 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018  
While Table 2 covered the totals for all types of reprogramming requests, Tables 3, 
4, and 5 will break this data down by specific reprogramming request type: internal, prior 
approval, and letter. 
Table 3 shows the total number of internal reprogramming actions from FY 2007 
through FY 2018 while Figure 7 graphs those trends. The number of actions were typically 
much higher from FY 2007 though FY 2012 (563 a year, on average), than they were from 
FY 2013 through FY 2018 (383 a year, on average). Additionally, there were more increase 
actions than decrease actions every year, with an increase to decrease ratio ranging from 
1.31 at the lowest in FY 2008 through to 3.36 at its peak in FY 2017. This suggests that, 
for internal reprogramming, larger accounts were being consistently tapped to help fund 
smaller ones. 




Figure 7. Change in Number of Internal Reprogramming Actions 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018  
Table 4 shows the total number of prior approval reprogramming actions from FY 
2007 through FY 2018 while Figure 8 graphs those trends. The number of increase and 
decrease actions is much more balanced, with an average increase to decrease ratio of 0.89 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018. This may indicate more one-for-one style adjustments, 
where a single budget activity is being specifically reduced to increase a different single 
budget activity.  
The number of prior approval actions show two bubble shapes where the number 
of actions rose and then fell, one starting in FY 2009 before bottoming out in FY 2013, 
after which the second bubble can be seen from FY 2013 through FY 2017. The first bubble 
may be attributable to cleaning up accounts associated with the Iraq War, while the second 
bubble may be attributable to cleaning up accounts after the passing of the Budget Control 
Act in 2012 (which will be more thoroughly analyzed later). 
Table 5 shows the total number of letter reprogramming actions from FY 2007 
through FY 2018 while Figure 9 graphs those trends. Their usage generally decreased 
during the period studied, and the vast majority of them were one-to-one transfers between 
accounts, with only a few exceptions having multiple decrease accounts feeding a single 
increase account. 
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Table 4. Total Prior Approval Reprogramming Actions 




Figure 8. Change in Number of Prior Approval Reprogramming Actions 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018  




Figure 9. Change in Number of Letter Reprogramming Actions 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018  
Table 6 captures the average number of reprogramming actions per request, showing 
that each internal (INT) and PA submission typically has far greater movement, or number 
of actions between accounts. Letter (LTR) reprogramming requests involve fewer total 
dollars per request and fewer actions overall. This is to be expected, as LTR reprogramming 
requests are briefly summarized on a single page using a memorandum format and do not 
need additional congressional approval. Having a single increase and decrease action in a 
single LTR request would yield the minimum number of actions possible of two, except in 
the case where a request was rescinded. In these rare situations, a request was still tallied, but 
the number of actions for that request was zero. One such request in FY 2008 was enough to 
tilt the yearly actions per document average down to 1.9. 
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Table 6. Average Number of Reprogramming Actions per Request 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
 
 
The previous tables and figures are enough to answer the first two parts of this 
secondary research question: “How many different reprogramming requests and actions 
occur annually.” The previous processes and representations will be repeated to answer the 
other part of this question: “What are the typical dollar amounts involved?” 
Throughout this paper when discussing dollar amounts, the data is presented in 
nominal dollars annotated directly from reprogramming document requests and was not 
adjusted for inflation. 
Table 7 shows the amounts representing the totals requested and approved for all 
types of reprogramming actions from FY 2007 through FY 2018. 
The left part shows the raw amounts transferred and are separated into two columns. 
The “Total Requested” is the unadjusted amount that was requested to be reprogrammed, 
while the “Total Approved” reflects the amount that was approved after congressional 
committees made any sorts of adjustments.  
FY 2008 had the most money reprogrammed, by far, with nearly $50 billion 
approved to be reprogrammed, followed by FY 2010 with nearly $35 billion approved to 
be reprogrammed. The amounts reprogrammed tapered off considerably before leveling 
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out at approximately $15 billion reprogrammed per year, on average, from FY 2014 
through FY 2018. 
For the total period covered, Congress typically approved 92.4% of the requested 
amount, on average. The year with the largest reduction percentage was FY 2014, where 
Congress approved 85.6% of the requested reprogramming amount, while the year with 
the lowest reduction percentage was FY 2008, where Congress approved 97.4% of the 
requested reprogramming amount. 
The right part of each table shows the number of reprogramming actions for each 
year, and the calculated mean and median requested amounts. It is split between an 
“Increase” and “Decrease” row for each fiscal year, because while the total amount should 
balance to zero between the increase and decrease sides of a reprogramming request, there 
are many examples where there were a different number of accounts between the increase 
and decrease sides utilized. When this is the case, one can expect the side with more actions 
to have both a lower mean action amount, and smaller median. 
Table 7. Amounts, Means, and Medians for all Reprogramming Actions 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 ($K) 
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While Table 7 covered the totals for all types of reprogramming requests, Tables 8, 
9, and 10 will break this data down by specific reprogramming request type: internal, prior 
approval, and letter. 
Table 8 shows the total combined dollar amounts for internal reprogramming 
requests from FY 2007 through FY 2018. There were only a few instances where the amount 
requested and approved differed, but FY 2010 stood out for its $443 million difference 
between the two, all of which was attributable to the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
(MRAP) vehicle program, parts of which were specifically denied by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and the Treasury. FY 2008 and FY 2010 had the largest 
prior approval dollar amounts approved for reprogramming, by a wide margin. This was also 
almost entire due to the MRAP vehicle program. When compared against the trends for the 
total amount reprogrammed, you can similarly separate between the same two time periods: 
FY 2007 through FY 2012, and FY 2013 through FY 2018. The earlier period had some 
fairly wild swings in the total amount, again mostly due to the MRAP vehicle program, but 
the latter period was much steadier at $5.8 billion reprogrammed per year, on average. 
Table 8. Internal Reprogramming Action Amounts, Means, and Medians 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 ($K) 
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Table 9 shows the total combined dollar amounts for prior approval reprogramming 
requests from FY 2007 through FY 2018. FY 2008 was the peak for reprogramming 
amounts by a fair margin at $19.1 billion total reprogrammed, largely in accounts related 
to the MRAP program. The amounts have generally been tapering off since. 
Reprogramming increase requests decreased considerably in FY 2013, likely as a reaction 
to the passing of the Budget Control Act. This drove the mean and median request amounts 
for FY 2013 higher than any other year, a 33% increase over the next highest amounts, 
which were in FY 2008. 
Table 9. Prior Approval Reprogramming Action Amounts, Means, and Medians 




Finally, Table 10 shows the total combined dollar amounts for letter 
reprogramming requests from FY 2007 through FY 2018. Their general use decreased from 
FY 2007 through FY 2018, while the amounts also typically decreased from FY 2007 
through FY 2016 before an uptick in FY 2017 and FY 2018. The mean amount 
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reprogrammed per action was fairly consistent between FY 2011 and FY 2014 at $180 
million, and again between FY 2015 and FY 2018 at $257 million per action. 
Table 10. Letter Reprogramming Action Amounts, Means, and Medians 




B. WHAT ARE THE REPROGRAMMING AMOUNTS AND FREQUENCIES 
FOR EACH AGENCY? 
This question seeks to identify which agencies are the most involved in 
reprogramming, both in the magnitude of dollars reprogrammed, and the frequency with 
which they are associated with a specific reprogramming action. This provides the potential 
for a quick look at the agency “winners” and “losers” for funding. 
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This data was manually entered and was then filtered and organized within 
Microsoft Excel. Reprogramming actions were separated between the Navy and Marine 
Corps on the reprogramming requests, while all falling under the broader “NAVY 
INCREASES” or “NAVY DECREASES” sections. They have been separated for the 
analysis as well, but the results will identify specific instances where the results and 
rankings would have been different had the Navy and Marine Corps items been combined. 
“Magnitude of dollars” will compare the amount of dollars reprogrammed from 
different organizational accounts between and within agencies. The “increase” and 
“decrease” sides will both be analyzed, because while the agency with the largest funding 
increase would likely be considered the “winner,” the one with the largest funding decrease 
would likely be considered the “loser,” which is also worth noting. 
Table 11 shows all cumulative monetary totals of all reprogramming requests, 
separated by agency, and sorted by the total reprogramming increase requested, from FY 
2007 to FY 2018. The Army was the clear “winner,” both in terms of their total 
reprogramming amount approved, and their net $38.7 billion funding increase between FY 
2007 and FY 2018, much of which was due to the MRAP vehicle program. The second 
most approved agency for reprogramming funding were those categorized as being 
“Defense-Wide,” with $78 billion in reprogramming increases. While this agency category 
ranks number two behind the Army, it was the largest in terms of funding decreased. 
Table 11. Total Amount of Dollars Reprogrammed from FY 2007 through FY 2018, 




One issue highlighted in Table 11 was noted while compiling the data. While 
typically every reprogramming request should balance to zero between the increases and 
decreases in the amounts requested and approved, there were several requests that did not. 
Some of these requests referenced other requests for reprogramming amounts, creating 
potential issues. Rounding errors may have accounted for some of the other identified 
problems. Lastly, human error likely played a role, potentially both for those creating the 
reprogramming requests, and in the entry of the information into this project’s data file. 
Ultimately, this requested difference was 0.405% of the total requested amount, and the 
approved difference was 0.212% of the total approved amount, so while this may be a 
problem, these relatively small amounts likely do not skew the data enough to change this 
study’s results in any meaningful way. 
To see a specific reprogramming dollar breakdown by agency for each fiscal year, 
see Appendix A. 
Now that magnitude of reprogramming dollars has been examined, the frequency 
of each agency’s reprogramming actions will now be presented. Each time an agency was 
involved in a reprogramming action, regardless of amount or whether it was on the increase 
or decrease side, an action was tallied for that agency. This data ultimately identifies which 
agencies are most often utilizing reprogramming. 
Table 12 shows the total number of reprogramming actions sorted by the total 
number of requested actions (the summation of increase actions and decrease actions), for 
each agency from FY 2007 through FY 2018. While Defense-Wide reprogramming actions 
accounted for the plurality of all reprogramming actions, adding the Navy and Marine 
Corps total reprogramming actions together would actually place the Department of the 
Navy second overall with about 23% of the total reprogramming actions. The Air Force 
would be third after the combined Navy/Marine Corps total with 22%, followed by the 
Army with 21%. While the Army placed fourth, recall that the Army also had the largest 
reprogramming increase amount by a fairly wide margin. This finding is again indicative 
of the effects of the MRAP vehicle program, whose large dollar reprogramming amounts 
were done in comparatively few actions. 
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Table 12. Total Number of Agency Reprogramming Actions and 
Column Percentages, sorted by Total Request Actions, 
from FY 2007 though FY 2018 
 
 
For a more complete breakdown by fiscal year for the total number of each agency’s 
reprogramming actions and column percentages, see Appendix A. 
C. WHICH FUNDING CATEGORIES HAVE THE MOST FUNDING 
REPROGRAMMED, AND WHICH FUNDING CATEGORIES ARE MOST 
FREQUENTLY INVOLVED IN REPROGRAMMING? 
Funding categories segregate funds and help categorize how money is specifically 
meant to be utilized. Analyzing funding categories allows for a broad understanding of 
how funding has been directed to be used, while specific programs are more easily 
recognized as budget activities, or group of sub-components that collectively comprise a 
funding category. Budget activities which will be more closely analyzed in Question D. 
This question seeks to identify which funding categories are most affected by 
reprogramming. 
Funding categories were typically copied verbatim from the reprogramming 
requests. The only exception was any funding category with the word “Procurement” in it 
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was bundled into a single “Procurement” funding category. For example, reprogramming 
actions whose funding categories were “Aircraft Procurement” or “Procurement of 
Ammunition, Navy” would have simply been entered as “Procurement” in the Excel 
workbook. 
Even after consolidating the procurement categories there were still 77 different 
funding categories involved in reprogramming from FY 2007 through FY 2018. This 
information was not segregated by agency, and primarily intended to identify which types 
of funding categories are most involved in reprogramming. 
Those funding categories which comprised more than 1% of the total increase or 
decrease approved reprogramming dollars will first be identified, followed by those 
funding categories which comprised more than 1% of the total number of reprogramming 
actions. Appendix B provides the information for all 77 funding categories, while also 
providing the year-by-year funding category breakdowns. 
Similarly, to how the agency data was presented, magnitude of money will first be 
shown, followed by the frequency of reprogramming actions. 
Table 13 lists the funding categories that collectively made up at least 1% of the 
total requested reprogramming increase amounts, while Table 14 accounts for the total 
requested reprogramming decrease amounts from FY 2007 through FY 2018, in order of 
percentage from highest through to the 1% threshold. O&M and procurement-based 
funding categories were clearly the most involved in reprogramming, much of which can 
be attributable to the MRAP vehicle program’s fluctuations. 
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Table 13. Funding Categories Comprising More than 1% of the Total 
Reprogramming Increases Requested from FY 2007 through FY 2018 ($K) 
 
Table 14. Funding Categories Comprising More than 1% of the 
Total Reprogramming Decreases Requested 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 ($K) 
 
 
“Frequency of adjustment” follows similar logic to the magnitude of dollars 
argument. Table 15 presents those funding categories whose cumulative total number of 
actions accounted for at least 1% of the total number of either the increase or decrease 
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reprogramming actions in order of percentage from highest through to the 1% threshold. 
Notably absent from this list is the MRAP vehicle program, indicative of the large amounts 
that were moved from this fund as single actions. The complete list can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Table 15. Funding Categories Comprising More than 1% of the Total 




D. WHICH BUDGET ACTIVITIES HAVE THE MOST FUNDING 
REPROGRAMMED, AND WHICH BUDGET ACTIVITIES ARE MOST 
FREQUENTLY INVOLVED IN REPROGRAMMING? 
Budget activities more specifically address what funding from a specific funding 
category is being applied to. While the O&M funding category gives a general 
understanding of how funds are being appropriated, a percentage of that funding is 
specifically going to the Communications and Electronic Equipment budget activity. By 
cataloging the budget activities affected by reprogramming, it can be better understood 
what types of programs, under the broader funding category umbrellas, are being affected. 
This question seeks to identify which budget activities are most affected by 
reprogramming.  
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Budget activities were typically copied verbatim from the reprogramming requests. 
Some exceptions were made in order to bundle together nearly identical types of budget 
activities. For example, every service except for the Air Force had an identical budget 
activity titled: “5: Modification of Aircraft.” The Air Force only had “5: Modification of 
Inservice Aircraft.” These budget activities were combined into “5: Modification of 
Aircraft”. 
Even after consolidating the budget activities there were still 191 different budget 
activities involved in reprogramming from FY 2007 through FY 2018. This information 
was not segregated by agency, and primarily intended to identify which types of budget 
activities are most involved in reprogramming. 
Similarly, to how the agency and funding category data was presented, magnitude 
of money will be shown first, followed by the frequency of reprogramming actions. 
Those budget activities which comprised more than 1% of the total increase or 
decrease approved reprogramming dollars will first be identified, followed by those budget 
activities which comprised more than 1% of the total number of reprogramming actions. 
Appendix C provides the information for all 191 budget activities, while also providing the 
year-by-year budget activity breakdowns. 
Table 16 lists the budget activities that collectively made up at least 1% of the total 
requested reprogramming increase amounts, while Table 17 accounts for the total 
requested reprogramming decrease amounts from FY 2007 through FY 2018, in order of 
percentage from highest through to the 1% threshold. The highest category in both tables 
were the reprogramming actions marked as not having a specific budget activity listed, 
which primarily consisted of funding categories related to the MRAP vehicle, O&M, 
military personnel, and drug interdiction and counter drug activities. Another ambiguous, 
high volume line were those funding categories that had no specific budget activity and 
were labeled with an “X” relating to those appropriations’ fiscal years. These were 
primarily associated with the Working Capital Fund (WCF), several O&M funding 
categories, and environmental restoration projects. The full breakdown of these items can 
be found in Appendix C. 
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Table 16. Budget Activities Comprising More Than 1% of the Total Reprogramming 
Increases Requested from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
 
Table 17. Budget Activities Comprising More Than 1% of the Total Reprogramming 
Decreases Requested from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
 
 
Next, a count of actions associated with specific budget activities will be presented. 
Table 18 displays the budget activities which comprised more than 1% of the total budget 
activities from FY 2007 through FY 2018. While the funding categories without a specific 
budget activity listed topped the list again, O&M specific budget activities comprised six 
of the top ten items in this list for 26% of the total reprogramming actions (Operating 
Forces, Reserve Component Training and Support, Administration and Servicewide 
Support, Communications and Electronics Equipment, Modification of Aircraft, and 
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Operation and Maintenance), while RDT&E had the remaining three budget activities in 
the top ten, comprising 11% of the total budget activity actions (Operational Systems 
Development, System Development and Demonstration, and Advanced Component 
Development and Prototypes). These O&M and RDT&E percentages are consistent with 
the funding category data presented in Tables 16 and 17. 
Table 18. Budget Activities Comprising More Than 1% of the Total Reprogramming 





E. ARE THERE SPECIFIC PERIODS THROUGHOUT THE YEAR WHEN 
REPROGRAMMING ACTIONS ARE MORE OR LESS UTILIZED? 
Reprogramming occurs continuously during each fiscal year. Congressional 
defense committees pass defense appropriations acts, which authorize the DoD to begin 
obligating funds. Congressional authorization is scheduled to be given on October 1st each 
year, but is routinely delayed due to disagreements on what should be funded and in what 
amount. When this timeframe exists between the beginning of the fiscal year and when the 
new appropriations are approved, the prior year’s funding is maintained under a continuing 
resolution, but with restrictions. Continuing resolutions are a hindrance because it prohibits 
the DoD from entering into new acquisition contracts and increasing funding levels from 
the prior year’s appropriated amounts. This causes a delay in each service’s ability to take 
corrective measures addressing defense capability gaps identified in the current year’s 
budget submission. 
Reprogramming is a near-term tool to help facilitate the shifting nature of defense 
objectives and requirements, as well as a corrective mechanism to move funding amongst 
programs that are not expending funds at projected obligation rates, or for programs over 
expended. If used as described, one may expect to see increases in the number of 
reprogramming actions when appropriation bills are passed and near budget review cycles. 
When collecting data, the first step was to separate the types of reprogramming 
(INT, PA, and LTR) by fiscal year, and the number of reprogramming actions per fiscal 
year. Each type of reprogramming was analyzed separately and sorted into the month in 
which each reprogramming request’s actions were approved from FY 2007 through FY 
2018. The specific day of approval was not factored into this analysis. 
Several requests did not have approval dates, but these outliers constituted less than 
1% of the total actions and requests. 
Descriptive statistics were not utilized when comparing the month-to-month 
numbers due to the standard deviation being near, or greater than the mean number of 
reprogramming actions. This yielded a correlation of variation percentage lower than what 
would be acceptable for meaningful analysis. The number of actions within a month for 
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each type of reprogramming were counted and compared with calendar-based events in the 
budget and review cycle to assess the timing aspect of reprogramming actions. 
There is no set requirement for the number of increases and decreases between 
funding sources per request submitted. Because of this, the frequency of movement 
between accounts, defined as a “reprogramming action,” allows for better comparison 
when viewed against the number of reprogramming requests submitted. The data, when 
viewed through this lens, ultimately yields the best insight as to when reprogramming is 
most frequent. 
For the purposes of counting reprogramming actions, both increases and decreases 
were counted separately. One reprogramming request can seek a sum of dollars from two 
separate funding sources, causing a decrease from two separate funding sources and a 
corresponding increase in funding for the single requesting source. This example would be 
counted as three reprogramming actions with one increasing and two decreasing actions. 
This method of counting gives more granularity into how many actual transfers occur 
between accounts. 
The approval month for each type of reprogramming action is quantified in the 
Table 19 and Figure 10. The bar graphs present the monthly sums of each specific type of 
reprogramming action from FY 2007 through FY 2018 (i.e., the October column would be 
the sum of the associated reprogramming actions from October 2007, October 2008, and 
so on, through October 2018).  
The data shows that PA actions have little or no activity near the beginning of the 
fiscal year. October and November had the lowest overall number of actions, and a 
combined eleven years with zero reprogramming actions during the twelve years of 
analysis. These two months accounted for only 2% of the total PA actions. 
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Table 19. Frequency of Prior Approval Reprogramming Actions by Month 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
 
 
Figure 10 illustrates the notable increase in PA actions beginning in the month of 
March that reaches its peak in June and July. May, June, and July collectively account for 
the largest consecutive three-month span for all types of reprogramming actions, 
comprising 59% of all PA actions from FY 2007 through FY 2018.  
Figure 10. Frequency of Prior Approval Reprogramming Actions by Month 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
INT reprogramming actions had a more even distribution throughout the analysis 
when compared to PA actions. Further, Table 20 shows that 13% of all INT actions were 
processed between October and November, providing one of the largest contrasting data 
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points when compared with PA actions, which had October and November totaling 2% of 
all PA actions. 
Figure 11 illustrates how INT reprogramming actions in September account for 
18% of all INT reprogramming actions. This is the last opportunity during the fiscal year 
when appropriations with one-year obligation availability periods can be transferred before 
the appropriation expires, likely explaining the uptick in the frequency of actions. 
Table 20. Frequency of Internal Reprogramming Actions by Month 




Figure 11. Frequency of Internal Reprogramming Actions by Month 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
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Table 21 and Figure 12 show the overall number of LTR reprogramming actions 
were far less than the number of PA or INT actions from FY 2007 through FY 2018. 
However, the percentage of overall actions were similar to the data gathered for INT 
actions, showing a large spike during the month of September and a more even dispersion 
of reprogramming actions throughout the fiscal year. This may stem from LTR 
reprogramming requests not requiring additional congressional approval (similar to INT 
requests), and therefore less administrative processing, which, in turn, more readily 
facilitates end of fiscal year submissions. The comparison between LTR and INT 
reprogramming actions, depicted in Figure 13 shows the similar pattern in actions per 
month between the two types of reprogramming. 
Table 21. Frequency of Letter Reprogramming Actions by Month 




Figure 12. Frequency of Letter Reprogramming Actions by Month 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
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Figure 13. Comparison of Letter and Internal Reprogramming Actions by 
Month from FY 2007 though FY 2018 
When comparing the total number of actions by month, the data shows July to have 
had most reprogramming actions approved, with 17% of all reprogramming actions. 
September and June follow July with 15% of all actions during each month, as shown in 
Table 22. These patterns follow the logic that most reprogramming occurs following mid-
year review cycles and near the end of the fiscal year to avoid losing funding for 
appropriations whose obligation periods are expiring. Typically, the mid-year budget 
execution review occurs in February, which accounts for the uptick in INT and LTR actions 
in March. The PA Omnibus takes longer to process, accounting for the increases in June 
and July. 
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Table 22. Frequency of All Reprogramming Actions by Month 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 Based on Approval 
 
 
The yearly omnibus request is a large single request that is typically used for PA 
reprogramming. The data showed only one instance of where an omnibus request was 
submitted for INT reprogramming in FY 2007, and no instances of LTR omnibus requests. 
The omnibus is often submitted after the mid-year review, which is a time when reserves 
held by commands can be released to other defense programs in need. 
An omnibus request typically has more actions per document than any other 
reprogramming request. Table 23 shows the percentage of omnibus requests per month 
from FY 2007 though FY 2018. There are two types of omnibus requests. The first type 
has the word “omnibus” in the subject title with the month or fiscal year, and the second 
type of request typically has “Military Intelligence Program (MIP) Omnibus” identified as 
part of the subject title. 
Table 23. Total Number of Omnibus Submissions per Month 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
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FY 2008 through FY 2010, FY 2013, and FY 2017 did not specifically have an MIP 
omnibus submission. FY 2013 did not have a regular (non-MIP) omnibus submission. 
However, during the years with no omnibus submissions, other PA requests with a large 
number of reprogramming actions were still submitted. For instance, reprogramming 
request FY 17–16PA (subject: June 2017 Prior Approval) had 130 reprogramming actions, 
making it the approximate size of a typical omnibus request. The timing of the approval, 
June, suggests this request was submitted after the mid-year budget execution review 
in February. 
The omnibus request helps explain why PA reprogramming had the highest mean 
number of actions per document submitted, and was the only reprogramming type to 
average more than 20 actions per request in a single year. 
F. HOW LONG DOES THE AVERAGE REPROGRAMMING ACTION 
TAKE FROM INCEPTION THROUGH TO ACCEPTANCE OR DENIAL?  
Reprogramming is crucial to meeting the emerging needs of the various DoD 
entities. It is important to know how long it could take to get a reprogramming request 
approved while also noting how long each step in the process may take.  
The dates that previous Navy PA reprogramming requests hit various intermediate 
and ultimate approvals were gathered from data on the PBIS website and organized by 
fiscal year. No information was available for INT or LTR reprogramming requests, or for 
any other agency. 
The number of Navy PA reprogramming requests for each fiscal year were then 
totaled. An average for the time between those requests’ first approval, when they were 
forwarded to Congress, and the time it took Congress to consider those actions forwarded 
for approval were calculated. These two individual averages were added together to 
determine the total average time the Navy’s PA reprogramming requests took to be 
approved for each fiscal year. While it is important to know the average for how long each 
request will take, it is equally important to have a range for how long a reprogramming 
request could take. The minimums and maximums were calculated for FY 2007 through 
FY 2018. All of the above information is displayed in Table 24. 
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Table 24. Average Days with Ranges for Navy Prior Approval Requests 




The “Average Days between First Approval and Being Forwarded to Congress” 
column was calculated by identifying the first office that approved the PA reprogramming 
request, which may have been the Office of Budget (FMB), DON, or Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD). Each of these transactions were slightly different, with many 
starting at the different points. Because of this degree of variability, the number of days 
reported was the average of all available Navy PA reprogramming requests for the entire 
fiscal year. Because not all of the Navy’s PA transactions went through all the committees 
for congressional approval, the same approach was used when calculating the average days 
in Congress. 
Figure 14 illustrates the average time in days that it took to approve Navy PA 
transactions from initial approval through congressional approval from FY 2007 through 





Figure 14. Average Days for Navy Prior Approval Requests 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
The overall average amount of time it took the Navy to process a PA 
reprogramming request from the first recorded PBIS date through congressional approval 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 was approximately 96 days. Breaking this average apart 
into its two components, the first half, approval through FMB, DON, OSD, and OMB took 
41 days, while the latter half, approval through relevant congressional committees took 
nearly two weeks longer at about 55 days. This suggests that FMB, DON, OSD, and OMB 
are slightly more efficient than the congressional committees in approving reprogramming 
actions. Regardless, knowing to expect a 96-day turnaround on average is helpful when 
considering creating a reprogramming request and when to submit the request. As shown 
in Question E, PA reprogramming actions are most frequently approved in July, which is 
indicative of the omnibus submissions that were likely drafted after the mid-year review in 
March. While on average it takes 96 days to complete the process, several requests had 
same day turn around, while the longest took 236 days for approval. 
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This data only looks at a count of physical days between each approval and does 
not account for whether or not Congress is in session, or factor in the frequency with which 
the relevant committees meet. This may account for why congressional approval takes 
longer.  
G. HOW FREQUENTLY DOES CONGRESS ADJUST REPROGRAMMING 
ACTIONS, AND ARE THERE ANY PATTERNS OBSERVED WITH 
THOSE ADJUSTMENTS?  
This question seeks to determine how often the congressional committees (HAC, 
SAC, HASC, and SASC) modify the reprogramming actions presented to them in 
committee. This was accomplished by first tallying how often a congressional committee 
made any adjustment, and then comparing the total reprogramming amounts requested and 
approved. 
Every reprogramming action that was modified by a congressional subcommittee 
was considered to have been “marked.” Table 25 captures the subcommittees’ 
reprogramming marks by fiscal year, showing how often each subcommittee was active in 
modifying reprogramming requests, while Figures 15 and 16 focus on the total number of 
marks each fiscal year, broken down by committee. The HAC and SAC accounted for 68% 
of the marks, while the HASC and SASC collectively accounted for the remaining 32%. 
In an interesting statistical twist, the number of marks between the House of 
Representatives and Senate were split at almost 50% between the two chambers: 499 for 
the House of Representatives and 506 for the Senate. 
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Table 25. Frequency of Marks by Congressional Committee from 




Figure 15. Marks by HAC and HASC vs. SAC and SASC 





Figure 16. Marks by HAC and SAC vs. HASC and SASC 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
FY 2013 immediately stands out in Figures 15 and 16, where the sharp decline in 
number of congressional marks (approximately 50%) coincides with a 31% drop in the 
total number of reprogramming actions from the previous year (as seen in Table 25). 
Moving on to FY 2014, the number of marks increased by 56%, while the total number of 
actions remained relatively constant. This dramatic increase in marks may have been the 
product of an increased sense of scrutiny after sequestration occurred in late 2013, as well 
as the length of the continuing resolutions. 
The number of marks having been addressed, the amounts they adjusted will be 
presented next. Bearing in mind that typically only prior approval reprogramming requests 
require congressional approval, Table 26 specifically compares the total amounts requested 
and approved for all prior approval reprogramming requests from FY 2007 through FY 
2018 in order to calculate each year’s approval percentages. Overall, Congress approved 
approximately 84% of the prior approval reprogramming request amounts.   
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Table 26. Percentage of Prior Approval Reprogramming Amounts 
Marked by Congress ($K) 
 
 
FY 2008 stands out as Congress only marked (denied) 6% of the prior approval 
reprogramming amount requested, the lowest percentage during the period of study. This 
was a bit of a perfect storm, as the amount requested to be reprogrammed more than 
doubled (an increase of 108%), while the number of prior approval reprogramming actions 
only increased by 9%. The number of congressional marks only increased by 34%, a figure 
much closer to the change in number of actions, as opposed to amounts requested. 
Ultimately, this indicates that there were several much larger prior approval 
reprogramming requests in FY 2008, which were approved in their entirety. Much of these 
increases were specifically tied to military personnel funding categories, for budget 
activities likely linked to OIF and OEF requirements as the drawdown began. 
FY 2008’s high approval percentage would not last long. By FY 2010, Congress 
marked 29% of the prior approval reprogramming amounts requested, the highest 
percentage during the period of study. From FY 2011 to FY 2013 the mark percentage 
steadily decreased (as did the amount being requested to be reprogrammed), before 
jumping to 23% in FY 2014. From FY 2015 through FY 2018, the percentage marked was 
much closer to the overall average from FY 2007 through FY 2018 of 16%.  
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H. WHAT CHANGES OR TRENDS HAVE OCCURRED DURING THE 
PERIOD OF ANALYSIS THAT MAY HAVE INFLUENCED 
REPROGRAMMING?  
There are numerous factors that may affect reprogramming magnitude and 
frequency, both directly and indirectly. Two noticeable trends, and one specific event that 
affected the DoD, between 2007 and 2018 may have impacted reprogramming and will be 
examined. The trends include the changes in the way supplemental appropriations (SUP) 
were utilized and the effect of a unified government, while the specific event analyzed is 
the passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011. 
The Financial Management Regulations (FMR) volume 12, chapter 23 states that 
DoD components do not normally budget for contingency operations and are to use 
available funds from cognizant command or units (OUSD(C), 2017). Contingency 
operations, or other war related expenses have been primarily funded with supplemental 
appropriations due to their emergent nature, which is outside the calendar-based DoD 
budgeting cycle. 
Supplemental appropriations were heavily used after 9/11 through FY 2010 in 
response to the nature of the attack. During the administration of President George W. 
Bush, those responses to the 9/11 attacks were collectively known as the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT), yet funding for GWOT had no specific designation other than being 
emergent in nature (McGarry, 2019a). 
As Barack Obama’s administration succeeded George W. Bush’s in 2009, the term 
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) came to be used in fiscal policy documents. The 
first request for OCO emergency funding was received by Congress in April 2009 
(McGarry, 2019a). This changed the nature of wartime related budget requests as now both 
the base and OCO requests were submitted together during the annual budget submission 
cycle. 
Table 27 shows the total enacted dollar amounts of the DoD’s base budget, SUP, 
and OCO appropriations by fiscal year, while also showing each fiscal year’s SUP and 
OCO appropriations as a percentage of the enacted base budget. From FY 2008 to FY 2009, 
the transition from utilizing SUP to OCO appropriations occurred. Subsequently, the 
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largest single percentage change between consecutive fiscal years in the analysis followed, 
with a decrease of approximately 6% between FY 2008 and FY 2009. 
Table 27. Magnitude of DoD Base Budget, Supplemental, and Overseas Contingency 
Operations Appropriations from FY 2007 through FY 2018 ($B).  Adapted 
from OUSD(C) DoD Budget Estimates FY 200 – FY 2020 (2020). 
 
 
Figure 17 depicts the total enacted dollar amounts of the DoD base budget, and 
SUP or OCO appropriation, depending on which was utilized that particular fiscal year. 
The amount of appropriated dollars for contingency operations decreases after the 




Figure 17. Magnitude of Enacted DoD Base Budget, Supplemental, and 
Overseas Contingency Operations Appropriations from FY 2007 
through FY 2018 ($B)  
Figure 18 shows the magnitude of dollars reprogrammed from the SUP to OCO 
transition through FY 2018. A sharp initial decline in reprogramming dollars occurred 
between FY 2008 and FY 2009, which was then followed by a gradual decline from FY 
2010 through FY 2014 before remaining relatively steady from FY 2014 through FY 2018. 
The sharp decline may be explained by the Obama administration’s transition to using the 
new OCO requests for war related budget submissions, and the decrease in overall OCO 
and Supplemental funding as a percent of the DoD budget. The end of major combat 
operations in 2014 brought the DoD back to a more “normal” spending and budgeting 
pattern. 
Referring back to Tables 13 and 14, accounts affecting funding categories, such as 
the Iraqi Freedom Fund, MRAP vehicle fund, Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer 
Fund (OCOTF), and Counterterrorism Partnership Funds, were all active in the early years 
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of this study to such an extent that they made the distinction of comprising more than 1% 
of the total reprogramming dollar increases and decreases during the analysis. 
The MRAP vehicle fund in particular even surpassed main funding categories, such 
as procurement and military personnel for total magnitude of decreases in reprogramming 
dollars, comprising 14.228% of all reprogramming decreases from FY 2007 through FY 
2018. 
 
Figure 18. Magnitude of Reprogrammed Dollars During Supplemental and 
Overseas Contingency Operations Appropriations from FY 2007 
through FY 2018 ($B) 
Figure 19 shows the frequency of reprogramming requests submitted from FY 2007 
through FY 2018, highlighting the transition from SUP to OCO appropriations with a red 
background. The frequency of reprogramming requests follows the same pattern as the 
magnitude of reprogramming dollars during the same period, with a sharp initial decline 
from FY 2008 to FY 2009, followed by a gradual decline through the period of analysis. 
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Figure 19. Total Reprogramming Request Submissions During Supplemental 
and Overseas Contingency Appropriations from FY 2007 
through FY 2018 
Since reprogramming was first introduced in the late 1700’s there has been a back-
and-forth relationship between Congress and the President on the Executive’s ability to 
spend appropriated funding in ways other than originally intended. When the Executive 
and the majority of the Legislative branch of government is aligned in their party affiliation, 
it is believed that the government becomes more cohesive and efficient with a relatively 
unified vision and purpose. This time of alignment is referred to as a “unified government” 
(Mann, 2016). 
For Congress, a unified government requires a majority of congressional 
membership, or “seats” in both the House of Representatives and the Senate to align with 
the President’s party affiliation. For the purposes of including more than two presidencies, 
the period of analysis on political party alignment covered calendar year (CY) 2001 
through CY 2018, and showed three periods where such a unified government existed, as 
described. Table 28 displays this information, which was derived from the House 
(House.gov) and Senate (Senate.gov) websites. 
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Table 28. Unified Government Breakdown from CY 2001 through CY 2018.  
Adapted from House.gov (n.d.) and Senate.gov (2019). 
 
 
The Republican Party achieved a unified government from CY 2001 through 2006, 
and then again in CY 2017 and 2018. While the Democratic Party had outright control of 
the House and coalition control of the Senate from CY 2007 through CY 2010, the sole 
instance of a unified Democratic government was achieved during the first two years of 
President Obama’s administration, from CY 2009 through CY 2010. 
Figure 20 depicts the total dollar amount reprogrammed from FY 2001 through FY 
2018, with the data from FY 2001 through FY 2006 obtained from the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)) website’s annual budget execution 
findings (OUSD(C), 2019a). Figure 20 also illustrates that when a new President takes 
office, there appears to be slight increase in the amount reprogrammed during the year 
immediately following the transition, as shown with FY 2002, FY 2010, and FY 2018. 
Seeing as Presidents George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump each began their terms with a 
unified government, this suggests that there may be a correlation between an increase in 
dollars reprogrammed and the existence of a unified government. 
The uptick in reprogramming may be caused by the DoD reacting to guidance 
suggested by the newly elected President, which was unaccounted for in the original budget 
submission, which had been drafted nearly two years prior to the year of budget execution. 
However, a unified government seems to be a more likely explanation for the gradual 
increases during the period of analysis. 
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When looking over periods of divided, or “non-unified” government, there is 
inconsistency with increases and decreases of dollar amounts reprogrammed each fiscal 
year. Due to this inconsistency, no clear correlation on magnitude of dollars reprogrammed 
can be determined from the data during these periods. 
 
Figure 20. Magnitude of Reprogramming with a Unified Government from 
FY 2001 through FY 2018 ($B).  Adapted from OUSD(C) (2019a). 
Figure 21 depicts the frequency in which INT and PA reprogramming requests were 
submitted from FY 2001 through FY 2018. OUSD(C) does not track the number of LTR 
reprogramming requests. The data is inconclusive when trying to determine if any 
correlation exists between the number of INT and PA reprogramming requests submitted 
per fiscal year during times of unified government. 
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Figure 21. Frequency of Internal and Prior Approval Reprogramming 
Requests with a Unified Government from FY 2001 though FY 2018.  
Adapted from OUSD(C) (2019a). 
A significant event affecting the DoD during the period of analysis was the 
enactment of the Budget Control Act (BCA) on August 2, 2011. The purpose of the BCA 
was to reduce the federal deficit by a minimum of $2.1 trillion from FY 2012 through FY 
2021, with a disproportionate amount of the savings coming from the DoD (McGarry, 
2019b). Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated:  
Let me be clear: As hard as the last 16 years of war have been on the 
military, no enemy in the field has done as much to harm the readiness of 
U.S. military than the combined impact of the BCA’s defense spending 
caps, worsened by operating for 10 of the last 11 years under continuing 
resolutions of varied and unpredictable duration (McGarry, 2019b, p. 3). 
Spending limits, or “caps,” are enforced by use of sequestration. Sequestration 
automatically goes into effect if cap limits are reached, and apply across all departments, 
effectively canceling budget authority in the amount needed to reach specified levels 
(McGarry, 2019b). Because OCO funding is exempt from these cap limits, agencies may 
have begun requesting funding to support activities that would normally have been funded 
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with the base budget, effectively allowing the DoD to increase its topline spending without 
exceeding the cap limits. 
Cap limits have typically met stern opposition within Congress and have led to the 
passing of several bills aimed at increasing budget authority. This, in turn, has lessened the 
effectiveness of the original intent of the BCA. 
Despite Congress having passed five separate bills to date which have amended the 
BCA and raised the spending caps, sequestration still transpired in FY 2013 and FY 2014. 
This caused an approximate $97.3 billion reduction in military related budget authority 
over those two years (Amadeo, 2020), and was noted within multiple DoD budget request 
submissions as a significant problem that hampered the DoD’s ability to successfully 
execute the national defense mission. 
Table 29 shows the difference between requested and enacted budgets from the 
DoD budget submissions immediately following the passing of the BCA in 2011. This 
table denotes only the DoD base budget and no other defense related budgeting. 
Table 29. Magnitude of DoD Requested and Enacted Base Budgets after the Budget 
Control Act from FY 2012 through FY 2018 ($B).  
Adapted from OUSD(C) (2019b). 
 
 
Figure 22 was taken from the DoD’s President’s Budget (PB) submission for FY 
2017 and further illustrates the disparity between what is requested to meet yearly strategic 
objectives, and what is enacted with the DoD base budget (OUSD(C), 2019b). 
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Figure 22. FY 2017 Projections for Magnitude of DoD Base Budget from FY 
2010 through FY 2021 ($B). Adapted from OUSD(C) (2019b). 
Figure 23 shows the total magnitude of reprogramming has decreased since the 
passing of the BCA in FY 2012, beginning with FY 2013’s budget, and has continued to 
stay below pre-BCA dollar amounts.  
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Figure 23. Magnitude of Reprogramming Before and After the Budget 
Control Act from FY 2007 through FY 2018.  
Adapted from OUSD(C) (2019b). 
Looking over the period of analysis, Table 30 shows 33 fewer reprogramming 
requests were submitted each year on average since the BCA’s enactment. The 
considerably smaller post-BCA standard deviation, when compared to the pre-BCA figure, 
indicates a much more consistent number of submissions. The still large overall standard 
deviation for the entire period covered, FY 2007 through FY 2018, is primarily reflective 
of the extremely high volume of requests in FY 2007 and FY 2008. 
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Table 30. The Budget Control Act’s Effect on Number of Reprogramming 
Request Submissions Per Year.  Adapted from OUSD(C) (2019a) 
and OUSD(C) (2019b). 
 
 
Figure 24 depicts the number of reprogramming requests before and after the 
passing of the BCA. This figure, as well as the data from Table 30, shows the number of 
reprogramming requests has initially declined since the passing of the BCA. Although the 
number of requests per fiscal year post-BCA is clearly less than pre-BCA, further analysis 
would be needed to determine if total reprogramming requests continue to decline and stay 
beneath pre-BCA numbers. 
68 
 
Figure 24. Frequency of Reprogramming Requests Before and After the 
Budget Control from FY 2007 through FY 2018.  Adapted 
from OUSD(C) (2019a) and OUSD(C) (2019b). 
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Reprogramming is a necessary tool to accommodate for a multitude of 
circumstances. It is a truly reactionary process, completely dependent upon unplanned 
developments. In a hypothetical perfectly budgeted situation with no unexpected outside 
influences, reprogramming would not be required. 
A. ANALYSIS 
Figure 25 illustrates the yearly percentage of the summed totals for DoD dollars 
reprogrammed from FY 2007 through FY 2018. The figure appears to show a correlation 
with a gradual decline in reprogramming requests, actions, and reprogramming dollars as 
a percentage of the total enacted DoD budget. This figure will be continually referenced as 
possible explanations for some of the magnitude and frequency patterns are presented. 
Additionally, whether or not relationships exist between these observations, congressional 
resistance, and other outside factors that may have affected the DoD will be examined. 
 
Figure 25. Reprogramming Dollars, Requests, & Actions as a Percentage of 
their Cumulative Total from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
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1. Timing and Dollars 
Chad Roum conducted extensive reprogramming research when he examined the 
available reprogramming data from FY 1999 through FY 2006. This research picked up 
where Roum left off, while also adding additional dimensions of analysis for consideration. 
Those familiar with Roum’s work may have noted some different terminology 
Roum used, which will be clarified here before continuing. Roum defined reprogramming 
“actions” as the number of reprogramming documents submitted per year, while this 
research refers to a reprogramming document as a “request.” This study defines a 
reprogramming “action” as when a single budget activity is formally requested to have an 
adjustment to their funding level, whether as an increase or decrease. Using this research’s 
terminology, the minimum number of “actions” for a “request” would be two – one budget 
activity whose funding is increasing, while another budget activity whose funding is 
decreasing. 
One other important terminology clarification needs to be addressed. A 
reprogramming request is said to have “occurred” on the date it was signed as approved, 
either on the bottom of the submission request form, or the date of a signed letter 
reprogramming request. The reprogramming process in its entirety takes considerably 
longer, from initial recognition of a changed requirement through congressional approval, 
but the actual final approval is what makes a reprogramming request actually occur. 
When viewing the data, prior approval (PA) reprogramming requests rarely 
occurred near the beginning of the fiscal year and were most frequent in June and July 
before significantly decreasing in August and September. Roum’s research showed zero 
PA requests occurring in the month of October, while the data found October PA requests 
in six of the twelve years examined. Regardless, these results still arrive at the same 
conclusion as earlier research, suggesting that the services are more reluctant to submit PA 
requests near the beginning of the fiscal year, which may be due to the anticipation of that 
new fiscal year’s defense appropriation being passed by Congress. Additionally, the PA 
reprogramming requests that are submitted early in the fiscal year (October or November) 
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are probably the result of moving around prior year funds in accounts such as RDT&E and 
procurement as there is no need yet to move current year funds. 
A yearly analysis on the number of PA actions showed two bubble patterns from 
FY 2007 through FY 2018, as noted in Figure 8 from Chapter IV. These bubbles were 
likely attributable to cleaning up accounts related to the Iraq War and the passing of the 
Budget Control Act (BCA). 
Our calculation of the Navy’s average of 96.28 days from when a PA request is 
first submitted through approval may be the factor driving a slowdown in PA requests 
between August and September. In accounting for this lengthy approval time, most services 
are likely fearing the looming expiration of certain appropriation obligation periods, 
which may be causing early submission of PA reprogramming requests before the end of 
the fiscal year. 
Unlike PA actions, internal (INT) and letter (LTR) reprogramming requests 
followed a more consistent monthly submission pattern throughout the year, but typically 
had the majority of their reprogramming actions occurring in September. INT 
reprogramming saw a spike in March with 11% of the total actions (nearly tripling the 
number in February), but the last quarter collectively had the largest number of actions for 
any quarter with almost 40% of all INT reprogramming actions occurring within this 
window. The relatively more even distribution of INT and LTR reprogramming actions 
throughout the year, when compared to PA actions, was likely due to INT and LTR requests 
not needing additional congressional approval, a requirement normally exclusive to PA 
requests. This eases the administrative burden and processing time for INT and LTR 
reprogramming requests. 
Yearly INT action analysis showed more average yearly actions from FY 2007 
through FY 2012 when compared with FY 2013 through FY 2018. INT reprogramming 
consistently had 77% more increase than decrease actions on average each year from FY 
2007 through FY 2018, a trend that continued despite consistently fewer INT actions being 
utilized from year to year. The overall greater number of increase than decrease actions 
suggests larger budget activities and funding accounts being reprogrammed down into 
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smaller ones. Ultimately, INT actions were the most common form of reprogramming, as 
INT had more total actions from FY 2007 through FY 2018 than PA and LTR combined 
over the same period, a finding consistent with past research. 
Roum’s research did not track LTR reprogramming, nor does the OUSD(C) website 
for information regarding magnitude and frequency. With no frame of reference for 
comparison, it was noted that LTR reprogramming followed a similar pattern when 
comparing the total percentage of actions with INT reprogramming, but the overall dollars 
involved were significantly less than both PA and INT reprogramming. September had 
20% of the LTR actions studied, making it by far the most frequent month for LTR 
reprogramming, and similar to INT’s trends. The increase in LTR reprogramming during 
September may be to prevent specific appropriations from expiring with unobligated fund 
balances.  
When combining PA, INT, and LTR data, the greatest number of monthly 
reprogramming actions occurred in July. Similarly, the fourth quarter of each fiscal year 
(July through September) collectively had more reprogramming actions than any other 
quarter. This may be the byproduct of the majority of annual reprogramming dollars 
coming from O&M appropriations with one-year obligation periods. The second half of 
each fiscal year saw the most reprogramming with approximately 70% of all actions, which 
can be explained by most requests not processing until after the mid-year budget review 
and the common practice of defense appropriations being approved later than the beginning 
of the fiscal year. This effectively shortens the budgeting year, giving less time to review 
the current year’s execution rates to help determine reprogramming needs. There are other 
methods available for the DoD to receive funding earlier in the year, such as 
reapportionment, but for the purposes of this research, the mechanism of reprogramming 
was the primary focus. 
2. Overseas Contingency Operations 
In 2009, the DoD changed the manner in which funding was requested for overseas 
military contingency operations by transitioning from the submission of supplemental “as 
needed” requests, to the submission of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) requests. 
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These OCO requests are expected to be submitted alongside the annual DoD base budget 
at the beginning of the fiscal year and were implemented in part because Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) related activities were becoming 
more predictable, rather than emergent in nature. 
Roum’s research theorized there would be fewer reprogramming requests and 
dollars related to supplemental appropriations occurring mid-year during his research. 
With the switch to OCO coinciding with DoD budget submissions, one may expect a rise 
in reprogramming frequency and magnitude, but this research observed the opposite. 
As illustrated in Figure 25, the shift to using OCO requests in FY 2009 for the bulk 
of war related budgeting was accompanied by the greatest year-to-year decrease in 
reprogramming dollars, requests, and actions. After the OCO transition, the amount of 
reprogramming dollars, requests, and actions continued trending downward, but cannot be 
definitively attributed to the new OCO request requirements. 
3. The Budget Control Act 
The passing of the Budget Control Act (BCA) in 2011 was a significant event for 
the DoD, placing noticeable stress on budgeting efforts beginning in FY 2013, as evidenced 
by the triggering of sequestration. Furthermore, the BCA created a sense of uncertainty in 
how DoD had been creating and submitting annual budget justifications. 
While the period pre-BCA had more requests, actions, and dollars reprogrammed 
than post-BCA, reprogramming requests, actions, and dollars had already been trending 
downward since FY 2008, likely in response to the drawdown after the Iraq and 
Afghanistan Wars. Due to the relatively close timing between the drawdown and the 
BCA’s enactment, the BCA cannot definitively be attributed as a singular influencing 
factor in reprogramming’s downward trends, and is much more comfortably described as 
a contributing factor. 
4. Unified Government 
Having a unified government was also thought to have an impact on reprogramming. 
Initial logic might suggest that one political party controlling congressional committees 
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while having a consensus opinion on defense-related priorities would easily translate to 
reprogramming adjustments. The data gathered on reprogramming dollars coincides with 
this assumption, showing an increase in the amount reprogrammed each year during periods 
of unified government immediately following the election of a new president. Oddly, the 
number of reprogramming requests could not draw the same conclusion showing 
inconsistency during the Bush administration’s period of unified government from CY 2001 
through 2006. This may be attributable to the services seeing less resistance in funding 
requests following the 9/11 attacks and a heightened level of support for DoD activities and 
operations, thus needing less of a reason to reprogram funding. 
The findings for periods of divided, or “non-unified” government, were 
inconclusive, and did not specifically identify a correlation between a divided government, 
and the magnitude and frequency of reprogramming. 
5. Congressional Resistance 
Congress is responsible for providing the necessary checks and balances to keep 
DoD spending under control. As stated in Chapter IV, Congress approved about 84% of 
the requested prior approval reprogramming amounts, on average. Deviations from the 
original requested amount took the form of either a reduction in the approved amount to a 
congressionally acceptable lower level, or outright congressional denial. Roum’s study 
noted that, with the exception of fiscal years 2004 and 2006, Congress generally approved 
every request at the original amounts. However, as OIF and OEF continued, their rising 
costs, in conjunction with a renewed national focus on the impending debt ceiling, may 
have increased the scrutiny on all aspects related to the DoD’s funding. While 
reprogramming requests were for money already budgeted, this new debt-centric mindset 
may have caused congressional committees to more closely scrutinize reprogramming 
requests, as the percentage of reprogramming amounts approved dropped significantly 
from 89% in FY 2007 to 71% in FY 2012—the lowest approval rate during the period 
studied. 
The passing of the BCA in 2011 may have initially eased some of Congress’ 
concerns about military spending, while also increasing their reprogramming approval 
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percentage rate. However, despite the new budgeting rules in place, sequestration still 
occurred in 2013, potentially igniting another period of increased scrutiny. The data 
supports this, as the approved reprogramming amount percentage increased to 88% in FY 
2012, before substantially dropping to 77% in FY 2014. Since FY 2014, the approval rate 
has steadied out at approximately 83%, which is only slightly lower than the overall 
average rate from FY 2007 through FY 2018 of 84%. 
Outside of expected additional scrutiny in periods of heightened attention on the 
national debt, there were no other specifically discernable trends or insights provided from 
the analysis. It is reasonable to expect prior approval reprogramming requests to only 
receive approval for approximately 84% of the requested reprogramming amount, and, for 
the period studied, you were equally likely to be denied in the House of Representatives’ 
committees as you were the Senate’s.  
B. CONCLUSION 
When looking across the data gathered and attempting to answer the research 
questions, it was only natural to continually return to the notion that larger scale conflict, 
and the manner in which it is fought and funded, may have a greater influence on 
reprogramming magnitude and frequency than any one specific piece of legislation or the 
politics of the day. 
After observing 2008’s large DoD budget increase and similar accompanying 
reprogrammed dollar amount increase, one can surmise the main categories and budget 
activities for which reprogramming is most likely to occur are indicative of land-based 
contingency operations, such as OIF and OEF. 
From a defense service perspective, the Army had the most dollars reprogrammed, 
which is reflective of their having the most personnel and a largest inventory of supporting 
equipment amassed during both OIF and OEF. However, it was the funding categories and 
budget activities associated with Defense-Wide programs that were found to have had the 
largest number of reprogramming actions, with many of those actions directly attributable 
to the OIF and OEF campaigns. Centering on actions related to OIF and OEF related 
reprogramming, the Marines, Air Force, and combined reserve forces reinforced the notion 
76 
that reprogramming was focused primarily on land-based operations during the period 
studied. 
Further analysis on the most common funding categories and budget activities 
found that activities directly supporting the operating forces, operations and maintenance, 
tactical support vehicles, and reserve training and support were all the most common 
reprogramming actions, and constituted a majority of the changes in funding (keeping in 
mind that much of the MRAP funding was categorized as not having a specific budget 
activity).  
When linking funding amounts to specific categories, it was noted that operations 
& maintenance (O&M) played a significant role, along with troop movement and support 
for the GWOT campaign. President George W. Bush maintained a relatively constant troop 
support level of 30,000 American troops deployed to Afghanistan during his 
administration, with the bulk of his focus engaging in the Iraq War and OIF operations 
(Montopoli, 2009).  
In the first year of the Obama administration, President Obama increased the troop 
support level to 47,000 in February 2009 due to the resurgence of Taliban and Al-Qaeda 
activity in Afghanistan. The troop surges that followed reached over 100,000 American 
troops in Afghanistan at the height of OEF operations (Mashal, 2020).  
The Army’s deployment manning numbers in Afghanistan have dwarfed the other 
services with 491,501 total troops deployed since 2001, as of September 2019. The Air 
Force provided the next highest manning with 123,196 total troops deployed to 
Afghanistan within the same time frame (Lamothe, 2019). With a high volume of troop 
movement, it is natural to expect that any changes in force levels would be accompanied 
by considerable adjustments in O&M and Military Personnel funding categories to adjust 
to the updated requirements. 
The procurement funding category had the next largest net total of dollars 
reprogrammed during the analysis, and together with O&M accounted for approximately 
52% of all actions and 48% of all dollars reprogrammed. During the period studied, the 
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle program dominated much of the 
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acquisitions world, and a considerable amount of dollars were reprogrammed in, and out, 
of its various funding categories. Rapid production and fielding of this vehicle called for 
an amendment to the FY 2008 GWOT request in the amount of $5.34 billion to procure 
1,520 vehicles, with 83% of those vehicles going to the Army and Marines (OUSD(C), 
2007). 
Roum’s findings were very similar, in that O&M was the largest funding category 
tapped in terms of dollars and actions, followed by procurement. More data needs to be 
compiled from future reprogramming fiscal years to determine if post-conflict dollars, 
requests, and number of actions remain at the current post-conflict levels, and to monitor 
the ratio of reprogramming dollars to the entirety of the DoD’s budget. Roum’s research 
ended in FY 2006 and hoped to glean this information from follow-on research, but 
OEF operations continued and major operations did not end in Afghanistan until late 
2014 (early FY 2015), giving only a few years of comparison without major military 
operations occurring. 
Our research began in FY 2007, which was after the start of the Afghanistan War, 
and at a time when the Iraq War and its related military operations were drawing down. In 
2015, with the formalized conclusion of major DoD GWOT operations, a new post-major 
operations period began (Witte, 2020). Table 31 compares the yearly dollars reprogrammed 
between the GWOT period, and ongoing post-operational period, finding an average yearly 
decrease of approximately 41% in dollars reprogrammed, 25% in reprogramming requests, 
and 19% in reprogramming actions. Furthermore, when comparing the magnitude of 
reprogramming dollars to the total enacted DoD budget between the major GWOT 
operations and post-major-operations periods, a 37% decrease in the amount of dollars 
reprogrammed is observed when transitioning into the post-major-operations timeframe. 
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Table 31. Yearly Averages for Reprogramming Dollars, Requests, Actions, and 
Dollars as a Percentage of DoD Budget from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
 
 
Table 32. Yearly Average of Reprogramming Dollars from FY 1999 
through FY 2018 
 
 
When combining Roum’s previous research with this study, a small sample size of 
pre-9/11 and post-major-operations data on reprogramming magnitude and frequency can 
be generated. Table 32 shows the average yearly reprogramming dollars from FY 1999 
through FY 2018, separated into three major categories: pre-conflict (FY 1999 through FY 
2001), during conflict (FY 2002 through FY 2014), and after major operations had 
completed (FY 2015 through FY 2018). The average dollar amount reprogrammed per year 
during the conflict ($26.707 B) would be slightly higher had Roum’s earlier research 
included LTR reprogramming. 
Roum’s research found that Pre-9/11 conflict (FY 1999 through FY 2001) had a 
yearly average of approximately $14.545 billion reprogrammed per year. Combining this 
with the post-major operations period (FY 2015 through FY 2018) yearly average of 
$15.195 billion yields an annual average of $14.916 billion reprogrammed during periods 
without major military operations being conducted. This figure would be slightly higher if 
Roum had tracked LTR reprogramming from FY 1999 through FY 2001. 
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While at first glance, the amount reprogrammed each year between these two 
periods looks very similar, there is a key notable difference. The average defense budget 
from FY 1999 through FY 2001 was approximately $295 billion annually, with the average 
annual $14.5 billion reprogrammed equating to approximately 4.9% of the base budget. 
Moving forward 15 years, the DoD’s post-major-operations period budgets from FY 2015 
through FY 2018 had more than doubled to approximately $622 billion annually. The 
average annual $15.2 billion reprogrammed now was only 2.4% of the total budget, 
indicating that despite increasing budgets, the amount reprogrammed, when represented as 
a percentage of the base budget, had been more than cut in half when compared to the pre-
conflict period. 
Finally, when comparing the pre-conflict and post-major operations timeframes 
against the main period of conflict for the GWOT campaign, the data shows this period 
had 79% more dollars reprogrammed annually. 
C. AREAS OF FUTURE STUDY  
The only timing resources available were for Navy PA reprogramming requests 
through the PBIS website. Increasing the scope to include the timelines for all 
reprogramming request types from every DoD agency would provide a more accurate 
picture for reprogramming processing time. 
When answering the amount of money reprogrammed, this research focused almost 
exclusively on the funding categories and budget activities but did not track the fiscal years 
associated with each of those individual actions. Accounting for the specific fiscal years 
associated with each line item would provide an additional dimension to dissect. 
Furthermore, it would be useful to better understand how reprogramming actions from 
previous fiscal years may affect the current fiscal year. This information could provide 
valuable insight into how much rework is conducted as a result of reprogramming actions. 
Most reprogramming requests balanced to zero between their increase and 
decrease sides, as expected, but several did not. While these discrepancies accounted for 
less than a half of a percent of the total reprogrammed amount the entire period studied, 
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it would take additional research to determine their root causes, and where the funding 
ultimately ended up. 
An in-depth analysis on periods of unified government dating back through the 
founding of the U.S. government may be beneficial in showing patterns in reprogramming 
magnitude and frequency. This data would be difficult to gather from periods before FY 
1999, which is when Roum began his research and is the first year of official data archived 
and available on the OUSD(C) website. Research into this area would allow greater insight 
into the periods on conflict and post-conflict while helping solidify correlation between the 
increases in dollar amounts reprogrammed during periods of unified government. 
Further expanding the scope for reprogramming to other governmental agencies, 
especially those who interact with the DoD on a regular basis, would provide better 
understanding of their respective roles within governmental budgeting. Bearing in mind 
that reprogramming is a solely reflexive action, identifying other agencies and 
organizations reprogramming priorities could help the entire planning, programming, 
budgeting and execution process flow more efficiently. 
As a result of Congress writing more complex authorizations and appropriations 
over time, there may be value in examining if the increase in ex-ante congressional control 
has had any impact or explains a greater willingness to deny certain reprogramming 
actions. Has a greater specificity in spending levels and appropriations resulted in an 
increased unwillingness to change those levels? 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the thirteen years that have passed since Roum conducted his initial study on 
reprogramming, the data was collected for this study in much the same way. Roum 
suggested in 2007 that it would be beneficial for the DoD to store these kinds of 
reprogramming data in a manner that makes accessing and manipulating it easier and more 
efficient. Having up to date information about how much money is moved and how 
frequently could put more of the financial management responsibility back onto the 
managers of those accounts as they identify their own programs’ trends, which could in 
turn change the way the budget is managed and money is reprogrammed. 
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In an age where data is vital, and decision makers receive daily briefings containing 
dozens of tables, figures, and charts, it is hard to believe that reprogramming trackers are 
not already being developed on the local level in some capacity. Formalizing this 
information into an agency-wide or DoD-wide program would create a valuable database 
and allow studies with a similar level of depth as Roum’s and this research to occur much 
more frequently – yearly even. Trends can be analyzed and incorporated into actual budget 
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APPENDIX 
A. AGENCY APPENDIX 
This appendix presents the agency level reprogramming monetary amounts, 
actions, and associated percentages, year by year, from FY 2007 through FY 2018. 
1. FY 2007  
Table 33. Reprogramming Amounts by Agency for FY 2007, Sorted by Increase 
Requested ($K) 
 





Table 35. Reprogramming Actions by Agency for FY 2007, Sorted by Total Actions 
 
 
2. FY 2008  
Table 36. Reprogramming Amounts by Agency for FY 2008, Sorted by Increase 
Requested ($K) 
 








3. FY 2009  
Table 39. Reprogramming Amounts by Agency for FY 2009, Sorted by Increase 
Requested ($K) 
 




Table 41. Reprogramming Actions by Agency for FY 2009 Sorted by Total Actions 
 
 
4. FY 2010 
Table 42. Reprogramming Amounts by Agency for FY 2010, Sorted by Increase 
Requested ($K) 
 




Table 44. Reprogramming Actions by Agency for FY 2010, Sorted by Total Actions 
 
5. FY 2011 
Table 45. Reprogramming Amounts by Agency for FY 2011, Sorted by Increase 
Requested ($K) 
 




Table 47. Reprogramming Actions by Agency for FY 2011, Sorted by Total Actions 
 
6. FY 2012 
Table 48. Reprogramming Amounts by Agency for FY 2012, Sorted by Increase 
Requested ($K) 
 




Table 50. Reprogramming Actions by Agency for FY 2012, Sorted by Total Actions 
 
7. FY 2013 
Table 51. Reprogramming Amounts by Agency for FY 2013, Sorted by Increase 
Requested ($K) 
 




Table 53. Reprogramming Actions by Agency for FY 2013, Sorted by Total Actions 
 
8. FY 2014 








Table 56. Reprogramming Actions by Agency for FY 2014, Sorted by Total Actions 
 
 
9. FY 2015 
Table 57. Reprogramming Amounts by Agency for FY 2015, Sorted by Increase 
Requested ($K) 
 




Table 59. Reprogramming Actions by Agency for FY 2015, Sorted by Total Actions 
 
 
10. FY 2016 
Table 60. Reprogramming Amounts by Agency for FY 2016, Sorted by Increase 
Requested ($K) 
 




Table 62. Reprogramming Actions by Agency for FY 2016, Sorted by Total Actions 
 
 
11. FY 2017 
Table 63. Reprogramming Amounts by Agency for FY 2017, Sorted by Increase 
Requested ($K) 
 





Table 65. Reprogramming Actions by Agency for FY 2017, Sorted by Total Actions 
 
 
12. FY 2018 
Table 66. Reprogramming Amounts by Agency for FY 2018, Sorted by Increase 
Requested ($K) 
 




Table 68. Reprogramming Actions by Agency for FY 2018, Sorted by Total Actions 
 
 
B. FUNDING CATEGORY APPENDIX 
This appendix presents the funding category level reprogramming monetary 
amounts, actions, and associated percentages, first presenting the cumulative totals for 
every funding category identified from FY 2007 through FY 2018, and then each individual 
year’s information. 
Funding categories were typically copied verbatim from the reprogramming 
requests. The only exception was any funding category with the word “Procurement” in it 
was bundled into a single “Procurement” funding category. For example, reprogramming 
actions whose funding categories were “Aircraft Procurement” or “Procurement of 




1. Cumulative Totals from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
Table 69. Cumulative Funding Category Amounts from 
FY 2007 through FY 2018 ($K) 
 
97 
Table 70. Cumulative Funding Category Actions from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
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The remainder of this appendix breaks down the funding category level 
reprogramming amounts, actions, and their associated percentages, year by year, from FY 
2007 through FY 2018. 
 
2. FY 2007 
Table 71. Reprogramming Amounts by Funding Category for FY 2007 ($K) 
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3. FY 2008 
Table 73. Reprogramming Amounts by Funding Category for FY 2008 ($K) 
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Table 74. Reprogramming Actions by Funding Category for FY 2008 
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4. FY 2009 
Table 75. Reprogramming Amounts by Funding Category for FY 2009 ($K) 
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Table 76. Reprogramming Actions by Funding Category for FY 2009 
 
104 
5. FY 2010 
Table 77. Reprogramming Amounts by Funding Category for FY 2010 ($K) 
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Table 78. Reprogramming Actions by Funding Category for FY 2010 
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6. FY 2011 
Table 79. Reprogramming Amounts by Funding Category for FY 2011 ($K) 
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7. FY 2012 
Table 81. Reprogramming Amounts by Funding Category for FY 2012 ($K) 
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Table 82. Reprogramming Actions by Funding Category for FY 2012 
 
110 
8. FY 2013 
Table 83. Reprogramming Amounts by Funding Category for FY 2013 ($K) 
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Table 84. Reprogramming Actions by Funding Category for FY 2013 
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9. FY 2014 
Table 85. Reprogramming Amounts by Funding Category for FY 2014 ($K) 
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Table 86. Reprogramming Actions by Funding Category for FY 2014 
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10. FY 2015 
Table 87. Reprogramming Amounts by Funding Category for FY 2015 ($K) 
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Table 88. Reprogramming Actions by Funding Category for FY 2015 
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11. FY 2016 
Table 89. Reprogramming Amounts by Funding Category for FY 2016 ($K) 
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Table 90. Reprogramming Actions by Funding Category for FY 2016 
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12. FY 2017 
Table 91. Reprogramming Amounts by Funding Category for FY 2017 ($K) 
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Table 92. Reprogramming Actions by Funding Category for FY 2017 
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13. FY 2018 
Table 93. Reprogramming Amounts by Funding Category for FY 2018 ($K) 
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C. BUDGET ACTIVITY APPENDIX 
This appendix presents the budget activity level reprogramming monetary amounts, 
actions, and associated percentages, first presenting the cumulative totals for every budget 
activity identified from FY 2007 through FY 2018. Next the break downs for those funding 
category line items that did not have a budget activity listed or were specifically denoted 
in reprogramming requests with an “X” will be presented, after which, each individual 
year’s information will be presented. 
Budget activities were typically entered verbatim into the spreadsheets, but some 
accounts and budget activities were consolidated into various groups after entry in order to 
streamline similar lines of funding. For instance, the Air Force specifically used budget 
activity “5: Modification of Inservice Aircraft” universally for their reprogramming 
requests, whereas the other branches utilized “5: Modification of Aircraft.” In this instance, 
the Air Force budget activity titles were all changed to match the other branches, to provide 
a clearer indication of what kinds of budgets were being modified. Finally, the specific 
defense-wide agency or activity (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics 
Agency, National Security Agency) whose budgets were modified were all captured where 
available, providing an additional level of detail not captured from the other agencies. 
1. Cumulative Totals from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
Table 95 shows the budget activity reprogramming amounts and column 
percentages for the increase and decrease requested and approved amounts, sorted 
alphabetically for ease of finding a specific budget activity. Table 96 shows the budget 
activity actions and column percentages for the increase, decrease, and total actions, sorted 
alphabetically as well. 
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Table 95. Cumulative Budget Activity Amounts from 











2. Special Budget Activity Groupings 
Starting with “(None listed),” Table 97 shows the cumulative amounts pertaining 
to individual funding categories that were noted as not having a specific budget activity 
listed from FY 2007 through FY 2018, and Table 98 shows their frequency. 
Table 97. Cumulative “(None listed)” Budget Activity Amounts 
from FY 2007 through FY 2018 ($K) 
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Table 98. Cumulative “(None listed)” Budget Activity Actions 




Now the funding categories whose budget activity was listed as “X” from FY 2007 
through FY 2018 will be presented. Table 99 shows the funding categories associated with 
these specific line items. 




Finally, Table 100 presents the number of individual actions associated with each 
of the funding categories whose budget activity was listed as “X” from FY 2007 through 
FY 2018. 
Table 100. Cumulative “X” Budget Activity Actions from FY 2007 through FY 2018 
 
132 
3. FY 2007 










4. FY 2008 








5. FY 2009 

























6. FY 2010 










7. FY 2011 








8. FY 2012 









9. FY 2013 


















10. FY 2014 



















11. FY 2015 








12. FY 2016 








13. FY 2017 










14. FY 2018 
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